Bridget Jones Never Gets Old

Bridget Jones, as a character, has always hovered uncomfortably between ==the hard light of reality and the rosy glow of romance== . When she first appeared, in newspaper columns written by the British journalist Helen Fielding during the mid-1990s, the 30- something Bridget was claimed as a ==totem== of woman ==hood== at the time: a calorie-counting, self-improvement-obsessed, chain-smoking, ==wine-guzzling singleton== (a ==neologism== Fielding ==immortalized== ); an ==earnest== ==vassal== of Cosmo culture and the embodiment of ==fearmongering== Newsweek coverage about the plight of unmarried career girls. With Bridget, Fielding “articulated the traumas of a generation,” the writer Alain de Botton observed.

But when Bridget’s diary ==entries== were published in book form, in 1996, her true narrative ==arc== was revealed. It didn’t chart a postmodern Gen X nightmare. It was lovingly ==cribbed== from Pride and Prejudice. The most notorious single woman of an era, as her fans learned in the book and its 1999 ==sequel== , and from the movies they inspired in 2001 and 2004, would be largely protected by the ==tired== old ==trappings== of the marriage plot: She would ==bag== her Mr. Darcy and live happily ever after—with a few ==detours== —in his ==dreamy== ==detached== house in Holland Park.

Her ==trajectory== over the next decade-plus (in another round of newspaper columns; another book; and a third movie, Bridget Jones’s Baby, in 2016, not based on a book) certainly had its ==requisite== ==stumbles== . But the character was ==steadied== throughout by the ==Texan== actor Renée Zellweger as the very English Bridget, an unpredictably brilliant piece of ==casting== that just works.

On paper, Bridget can be ==compellingly== hard to ==pin down== , ==inconstant== and ==ironic== , ==messily self-aware== , undeniably human. Early on, she ==cops== to highly compromised feminist principles: She will not “ ==sulk== about having no boyfriend, but develop inner ==poise== and authority and sense of self as woman of substance, complete without boyfriend, as best way to obtain boyfriend.” On-screen, though, Zellweger makes her all heart, ==guileless== as a ==toddler== , impossibly hopeful and ==lovably== absurd. Whatever cards she’s dealt—not least professional ==humiliation== and an accidental pregnancy (paternity unclear, thanks to separate one-night stands and a box of expired ==eco-friendly condoms== )—she ==muddles== through with ==gusto== . We know that Bridget will get her happy ending; this is just about the last romantic-comedy ==franchise== standing. But Zellweger makes us also deeply want her to win, formulaic predictability be damned.

Bridget Jones: Mad About the Boy, an adaptation of the ==slapdash== third novel that starts ==streaming== on Peacock on February 13, keeps the ==trope-laden structure== , but finds surprising depth in a devastating plot twist. Bridget, now in her 50s, is single once again: Her beloved husband, Mark Darcy (played in grand ==metafictional== form by an actor who played the other Mr. Darcy, Colin Firth), has died while on a ==humanitarian== mission in Sudan, leaving Bridget to raise their two children alone. The book uses Mark’s death mostly as a narrative device to launch Bridget, with her typically obsessive energy, into ==cougardom== : She starts dating a ==hunky== man in his late 20s named— ==inanely== —Roxster, which exposes Bridget to a whole new range of body-image issues, and exposes Roxster to her children’s head ==lice== .

The movie, though, is more interested in documenting Bridget’s loss, and in the process, it presents a more honest and moving version of her than we’ve seen before. How will the last cockeyed optimist in popular culture deal with such desolation? ==Widowhood== is no laughing matter, parenting alone even less so—though we have to laugh at Bridget burying her face in the ==fridge== to curse, and being surprised by her son’s ==uptight== science teacher while buying an astonishing variety of ==contraceptives== . ==Pathos== ==underpins== the plot. “Do you miss Dada sometimes?” Mabel, Bridget’s daughter, asks her in the movie. “I miss him all of the times,” Bridget replies.

==Grief== is a tough sell for a ==rom-com== , which is maybe why the movie has marketed itself as something more timely, once again positioning Bridget as representative of her moment. Cinema lately has been consumed with what viewers call the “ ==age-gap romance== ,” or, less ==decorously== , the “MILF setup.” In 2024’s The Idea of You, Anne Hathaway plays a divorcée not unlike Bridget in her ==ditziness== , who ==careens== her way into a love affair with a handsome British ==boy-bander== . In two separate movie projects within the space of a year, A Family Affair and Babygirl, Nicole Kidman ==parses== the power differentials at play when older women find ==fulfillment== with younger men.

Bridget’s adventures with the age gap are characteristically sweet and ==laced== with ==goofiness== : When she meets Roxster, she’s shinnying up a tree that both of her children have managed to get stuck in. When he later messages her on Tinder, it’s via an account that her friends have set up: “Tragic Widow Seeks Sexual Awakening.” ==Mortification== , for Bridget, is only ever a degree or two removed from triumph.

Yet Mad About the Boy, for all its familiar, delightful notes, is also ==wincingly== ==astute== regarding modernday dynamics, good and bad, for women of Bridget’s age. When her friends encourage her to pursue Roxster, the idea is plausible not just because Zellweger is still ==luminously== ==endearing== in ==midlife== , but because the world really has changed: Women can date men a decade or more younger ==without inciting mass hysteria== . But they’ve remained undesirable in other ways: Bridget works as a producer for a daytime TV show where formerly ==hard-hitting== female news reporters now ==gush== their way through ==cooking segments== and ==softball interviews== . For female journalists over a certain age, “HDTV was an ==extinction-level== event,” Bridget’s friend Talitha ==mutters== .

The tension between sharp contemporary ==verisimilitude== and ==age-old romantic archetype== helps explain why Bridget ==potters== on while so many other ’90s heroines have fallen by the wayside. (Remember Ally McBeal? She of the ==miniskirts== and the ==catfights== and the ==ludicrous== workplace dilemmas?) The book version of Bridget has come in for ==derision== as an embarrassing relic of ==postfeminism== , screwing up even the most basic personal and professional tasks, and fixated on her thigh ==circumference== and her office crushes. In 2023, a New York Times retrospective finally declared her “ ==nuttiness== and ==self-loathing== ” to be well past its expiration date for modern readers. Yet her movie comebacks continue to be irresistible, in part because no one is more aware of her failings than Bridget herself.

Crucially, she never lets her ==self-critique== shake a confidence lodged someplace inside her (even if she’s not quite sure where). The academic Kelly A. Marsh has argued that despite her ==ongoing== preoccupation with becoming better, Bridget at her core represents, through all her phases, the victory of self-acceptance. She flourishes not just because of the love stories that the novels’ framing forces on her, but thanks to the faithful love of her friends and her own ==stouthearted== spirit.

There’s something ==poignant== , too, about seeing Zellweger in the role, despite all the ==indignities== the actor has suffered along the way—the 2000 cover shoot for Harper’s Bazaar, rudely shelved because Zellweger had gained weight for the role and was deemed too fat for a fashion magazine; the ==tabloid== coverage declaring her “ ==scary skinny== ” when she then duly dieted; the discourse about her changing face, so rabid and intrusive that she had to strike it down in a personal essay for HuffPost. At 55, Zellweger is in what Germaine ==Greer== once cited as a decade of new “invisibility” for women—a phenomenon that Bridget herself analyzes in her diary. And yet here they both are: ==undaunted== , blond, adorable, enduring, changing the world by refusing to ==shrink away from it== . That, as Bridget might say, is v.v. good to see.

Vocabulary, Phrases and Sentences

Words Chinese Definition Phonetic Symbol
the hard light of reality and the rosy glow of romance 现实的刺眼光芒与浪漫的 rosy 光辉 /ðə hɑːd laɪt ɒv riˈæləti ænd ðə ˈrəʊzi ɡləʊ ɒv ˈrəʊmæns/
totem 图腾 /ˈtəʊtəm/
hood 风帽;兜帽;(汽车发动机的)罩;(非法团伙成员常戴的)头罩 /hʊd/
wine-guzzling singleton 酗酒的单身人士 /ˈwaɪn ˈɡʌzlɪŋ ˈsɪŋɡltən/
neologism 新造词;新词 /niːˈɒlədʒɪzəm/
immortalize 使不朽;使永存;纪念 /ɪˈmɔːtəlaɪz/
earnest 认真的;诚挚的;热切的 /ˈɜːnɪst/
vassal 附庸;臣属;诸侯 /ˈvæsl/
fearmonger 散布恐惧者;制造恐慌者 /ˈfɪəmʌŋɡə(r)/
entry 进入;入口;参赛作品;条目 /ˈentri/
arc 弧;弧形(物);电弧;弧光 /ɑːk/
crib 婴儿床;抄袭;剽窃 /krɪb/
sequel 续集;续篇;后续的事 /ˈsiːkwəl/
tired 疲倦的;累的;厌烦的 /ˈtaɪəd/
trapping (动物的)皮毛;陷阱;圈套;伏击 /ˈtræpɪŋ/
detour 绕道;弯路;迂回路 /ˈdiːtʊə(r)/
dreamy 梦幻般的;轻柔的;恍惚的;心不在焉的 /ˈdriːmi/
detached 分开的;分离的;超然的;冷漠的 /dɪˈtætʃt/
trajectory 轨道;轨迹;弹道 /trəˈdʒektəri/
requisite 必要的;必不可少的;必需品 /ˈrekwɪzɪt/
stumble 绊脚;跌跌撞撞地走;蹒跚;犯错;失足 /ˈstʌmbl/
steady 稳定的;平稳的;持续的;坚定的;使稳定 /ˈstedi/
texan 得克萨斯州的;得克萨斯州人 /ˈteksən/
casting 铸造;铸件;投;掷;选派角色 /ˈkɑːstɪŋ/
compellingly 引人注目地;令人信服地 /kəmˈpelɪŋli/
pin down 确定;查明;准确描述;迫使明确表态 /ˈpɪn daʊn/
inconstant 无常的;多变的;反复无常的 /ɪnˈkɒnstənt/
ironic 具有讽刺意味的;反讽的 /aɪˈrɒnɪk/
messily self-aware 凌乱地自我意识 /ˈmesəli ˈself əˈweə(r)/
cop 警察;抓住;逮捕 /ˈkɒp/
sulk 生闷气;愠怒 /ˈsʌlk/
poise 沉着;镇定;泰然自若;姿势;姿态 /ˈpɔɪz/
guileless 诚实的;坦率的;不狡诈的 /ˈɡaɪlləs/
toddler 学步的幼儿 /ˈtɒdlə(r)/
lovably 可爱地 /ˈlʌvəbli/
humiliation 羞辱;耻辱;蒙羞 /hjuːˌmɪliˈeɪʃn/

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Who’s Your Mommy?

In the spring of 2022, I was 36 years old and jumping up and down in my bathroom, trying to ==figure out== my future. I had ordered ==a fertility test== online that said it would provide fast results with just a few drops of blood. The videos on the company’s website featured a smiling blond woman jumping—to stimulate blood flow, naturally—and then ==e­ffortlessly== ==dribbling== blood from her nger tips all over a little strip of test paper. All I had to do was be like her. Joyful. ==Sanguineous== . Fertile.

For years, my husband, Rich, and I had ==gingerly== walked the prime ==meridian== between wanting and not wanting kids, usually leaning toward the “no” side. Having a baby had seemed un a­ ordable and impossible. On days when I nished work at 8 p.m., the thought of ==procreating== made me laugh, then ==shudder== .

Recently, though, I’d begun to reconsider. I was in the midst of an ==admittedly== strange-sounding project: I was spending a year trying to change my personality. According to a scientific personality test I’d taken, I scored sky-high on ==neuroticism== , a trait associated with anxiety and depression, and low on ==agreeable== ==ness== and ==extroversion== . I lived in a constant, ==clenched== state of dread, and it was poisoning my life. My therapist had stopped laughing at my jokes.

But I had read some scientific research suggesting that you can change your personality by behaving like the kind of person you wish you were. Several studies show that people who want to be, say, less isolated or less anxious can make a habit of socializing, meditating, or journaling. Eventually these habits will come naturally, ==knitting== together to form new traits.

I knew that becoming a parent had the potential to change me in even more profound ways. But I had no idea how. My own mother once said to me, “I can’t picture you as a mother.” The truth was, neither could I.

I wasn’t sure I could get pregnant, even if I wanted to. My age put me in a category that was, in a less delicate time, called “ ==geriatric== ” for pregnancy, and one doctor told me my eggs were probably of “poor quality.” The fertility test I’d ordered was meant to determine if those eggs were ==serviceable== . In the bathroom, I unwrapped the ==glossy== white box. The instructions said the test would take 20 minutes and require a pack of ==lancets== . I grabbed one and ==stabbed== it into my geriatric forefinger. Two hours, five lancets, and a ==graveyard== of ==gauze== and alcohol wipes later, I still hadn’t squeezed a single ==droplet== out of my finger. Was I not jumping high enough? Was I already failing as a mother?

I was worried I wouldn’t be able to have a baby. I was also scared to death of having one.

Arguably, many things are wrong with me. I was raised by Russian immigrants who constantly worried that the “ ==dark day== ” was upon us, so hopeful thoughts about the future of humanity don’t come naturally. I’m not a person who is a­ ected by cuteness. I’ve never liked holding—or even really looking at—other people’s babies. I don’t like animals. I couldn’t imagine ==cooing== and smiling at a baby as much as science says you’re supposed to for their brain development.

My neuroticism made it especially hard to decide if I wanted kids, because no process is more ==rife== with uncertainty than parenting, and nothing scares anxious people more than uncertainty. I worried that Rich and I would ght more, and that our relationship would su­ er. I worried about sleep ==deprivation== . I felt ==torn== between my lifelong conviction that people shouldn’t create problems for themselves and my (apparent) desire to do just that.

I would wake up in the middle of the night and Google things like percent ==miscarriage== pregnant while 36?; anxiety pregnancy miscarriage causes; Diet Coke fetal defects; pregnancy brain stops working hands stop working. These searches surfaced ==horrific== ==anecdotes== , but never any conclusive answers about what I should do. One time, I Googled reasons to have kids and found an article that labeled all the reasons I had come up with—like being cared for in old age and having someone who loves me—with the heading “Not-So-Good Reasons to Have Children.”

But then I would remember the times we visited Rich’s mom, who had ==dementia== , in her nursing home. ==Her face lit up at the sight of him== . “My son, my son, my only son,” she’d say, grabbing his arm. He was the only person she still recognized. The visits were a reminder that the people who matter most at the end are your children. The readers of your blog posts won’t make the trip.

Heather Rackin, a sociologist at Louisiana State University, found in a study that the death of a mother or sibling increased the likelihood that a woman would give birth within two years. The e proximity of death is, perhaps, ==a wake-up call== . Who will remember us? The study was based on Rackin’s personal experience: When her father died in 2017, she decided not to wait any longer to have kids. His death got her thinking, she told me, about what was important in life: the experience of being loved and the chance to provide that love for someone else. Her rst child was born in 2019.

There are many reasons to postpone or avoid having children— the cost, the responsibility, ==the existence of and use case for the NoseFrida== . But in addition to the practical challenges, a narrative has taken hold: Everything changes when you become a mother.

Once they reach their 30s, many people have carefully cultivated friend groups and ==sourdough== starters and five-year plans. They “really have a good sense of who they are, and then having a baby totally disrupts everything that they thought they knew about themselves,” says Lauren Ratli  , a ==perinatal== therapist in Illinois. Of course, this is where I di  er from the rest of my ==cohort== . By the time I was ready to have a baby, I’d already been trying to disrupt everything about myself.

For my personality-change project, I had experimented with science- backed strategies to turn down my neuroticism and ==amp== up my ==extroversion== and ==agreeableness== . I had spent hundreds of hours trying out different ==iterations== of ==mindfulness== , culminating in a day-long meditation retreat that almost killed me with boredom but somehow ==alleviated== my depression. Among other agreeableness-boosting activities, I traveled to London for a “conversation workshop,” where I learned techniques that can make even British people show an emotion. And to become more extroverted, I went out as much as humanly possible. I played table tennis. I did ==improv== , and survived.

For the most part, my efforts worked: I no longer thought of talking with people as a waste of time. I became less afraid of uncertainty and disappointment. I made one very good new friend. I drank less.

I had been changing, but it was a type of change that I directly determined. I could go to happy hour, or not. I could meditate, or stop. I was aware that ==parenthood== would ==transform me further== , but what I found unsettling was that I couldn’t know exactly how. Bizarrely, for the biggest disruption of your life, study after study shows there’s no “typical” way that becoming a parent changes your personality. Some studies have found tiny average decreases in extroversion or openness among new parents— but even those findings aren’t consistent.

Despite my progress, I was still too ==neurotic== to feel comfortable ==surrendering== control and letting biology ==mold== me into someone I couldn’t predict and might not recognize.

After doctors pronounced me insufficiently fertile, Rich and I decided to just stop being careful one month and see what happened. We figured we would at least have some fun before we ==embarked== on our ==arduous== “fertility journey.”

A short time later, on a ==choppy== boat tour in Europe, I couldn’t stop ==leaning over== the edge of the ==catamaran== and ==hurling== .

“Do you think you might be pregnant?” Rich whispered ==as the boat crew force-fed me pita bread== .

“Don’t be ==insane== ,” I said. Everyone knows that 37-year-olds— especially infertile ones—don’t get pregnant on their first try.

A week after that, I found out that I had indeed gotten pregnant on my first try.

Being pregnant means having your brain replaced with an anxiety T-shirt cannon. I didn’t feel ==glowy== or ==goddessy== ; I felt crazy. None of my friends has kids, and many of them reacted to my news like I’d gotten a face ==tattoo== . One sent me a TikTok of everything that can ==supposedly== go wrong in pregnancy, including the possibility that ==vomit== will come out of your eyes. (It won’t.) I spent more and more time by myself, obsessing over which ==swaddles== were best. (We didn’t end up using any.)

Thanks to ==a king tide of hormones== , ==irritability== ==spikes== during the first and last ==trimesters== of pregnancy. People say your baby will remember the sounds they hear in the ==womb== , but I fear mine detected little in there other than me screaming at his father. Every few weeks, something would ==set me off== , at a deafening volume. If they’d ==overheard== me, those couples therapists who say ==contempt== is the most glaring sign of a failed relationship would probably have advised us to start ==divvying== up our furniture.

Sometimes when I was yelling, being so mean felt amazing— as though I’d finally ==engulfed== Rich in my distress. Obviously you need a travel ==stroller== and a regular stroller! I always apologized, and Rich always accepted my apology. But one time he said, “You know that with a kid, ==that’s not really something you can take back, right?== ” Sometimes, late at night, after yet another argument, I would rotate my ==spheroid== belly toward Rich and ask, “What if I turn out to be a bad mother?”

The rest of the pregnancy was horrible. I didn’t think it was possible to feel so tired and still be technically alive. At my baby shower, when some friends asked me how I was feeling, I quoted the Russian ==dissident== Boris Nadezhdin responding to a question about whether he feared ==imprisonment== or death: “The ==tastiest== and the sweetest years of my life are already in the past.” (This is is the closest Russians get to excited.)

Three weeks before my due date, after a routine ultrasound, my high-risk ob-gyn walked briskly into the room. She looked around for something to sit on and, finding nothing, ==plopped down on top of a closed trash== can. She told me that something was wrong with my ==placenta== , and that the baby was in danger. And that I should now ==walk over to the delivery wing of the hospita== l.

==In the antechamber of the operating room== , I ==hyperventilated== in my paper gown and tapped out emails to all my sources and ==bosses== : I’m having an emergency C-section today, so I won’t be available for the next few months. My last day of caring whether people were mad at me.

Afterward, while ==the medical residents== were rearranging my ==innards== , I thought I heard one of them ask me something.

“I’m sorry, I don’t know what’s going on down there at all,” I said across the blue curtain.

“That’s … probably for the best,” the resident said.

HE CAME OUT with white hair, a perfectly round face, and a ==grumpy== expression, like the leader of a former Yugoslav republic. I called him “Slobodan” a couple of times, until Rich told me to stop.

Because he was early, we panic-picked a name from our shortlist— Evan. The same day he was born, doctors ==whisked== him away to the ==NICU== ; I saw him only a few times before we were all sent home days later. My ==discharge paperwork== said, “Mom is ==breastfeeding== four or five times a day,” which was funny because at that point I had not done it successfully even once. It was also funny because I—quite possibly the least qualified person for the job—was apparently “Mom.”

Once home, we entered the period we now refer to as “Cute Abu Ghraib.” ==Sleep deprivation== ==addled== me to the point that, on a call with the ==pediatrician== , I forgot the baby’s name. When Evan was two weeks old, I ==bit into a piece of chicken== and tasted something ==bloody== and sharp. I had ground my teeth so hard during his NICU stay that I’d ==loosened a crown== .

We ==agonized== over whether the ==gyrations== of the SNOO Smart Sleeper Bassinet would rattle his brain too much, then grew too exhausted to care. I became the CEO of Baby Inc., and Rich was employee No. 1; we communicated only about ==ointments== and ==ounces== . I finally had the big ==boobs== of my dreams, but the only man who saw them was two feet tall and couldn’t read.

But then something interrupted the misery. One night, I was holding Evan while he was sleeping. I had read that singing to your baby was beneficial, so I decided to ==serenade== him with one of the few songs I know by heart: “Forever and Ever, Amen,” by Randy Travis. Except I couldn’t seem to get through the fourth line: “This is love that I feel for you always will be.” I, a bad bitch who has never cried at a wedding, kept choking up.

Rich asked me if I was okay.

“Whatever!” I said, ==tears rolling down my cheeks== . “Shut up!”

I thought ==motherhood== would be a forced march through inert ==babyhood== and ==feral== ==toddler== years before we finally reached the golden time of my imagination: having a talking, ==precocious== elementary schooler. But there I was, flooded with adoration for someone who barely registered my presence. I’d hated being pregnant, so I thought I would hate having a baby, too. But I loved him. I loved this.

Recall the research showing there’s no one way that parenthood tends to change people’s personalities. Anecdotally, researchers told me that they do notice certain patterns among new parents. Most moms worry about their kid, more or less constantly, from the minute they find out they’re pregnant. “ ==Signing up to be a parent is signing up to have a lifetime of some degree of depression and anxiety== ,” Ratliff , the therapist, told me.

New parents’ satisfaction with their romantic relationship goes down, especially for mothers, and especially in the first year. “ ==Guilt is another universal== ,” says Aurélie Athan, a clinical psychologist at Columbia University’s Teachers College, who researches the transition known as “ ==matrescence== .” ==The creeping sense== that you should be with your kid while you’re working and working while you’re with your kid apparently never goes away.

She told me that mothers become more ==attuned== and ==prosocial== — more caring and empathetic toward others. Athan said this is why so many mothers cry when their babies cry and have a hard time watching ==gory== movies. “Moms get a really bad taste in their mouth with violent television or looking at images of war,” she said.

That’s where she lost me. My son had ==colic== ; for the first four months, he screamed like the possessed unless he was within the ==jiggly confines of his SNOO== . The ==doula== we hired referred to him, alternately, as “Mr. Cheeks,” “Mr. Crab,” and, ==sarcastically== , “Mr. Wonderful.” If I had cried every time he cried, I wouldn’t have had time to do anything else.

Eventually, Rich and I grew desensitized, or felt like we had to match his chaotic energy with equally intense ==stimuli== . One night, after Evan ==wailed== in our ears for two hours, we shuffed downstairs and collapsed onto the couch. There was only one thing we could think to watch that would serve as a ==comedown== from what had just happened: Saving Private Ryan.

“Did you remember to ==sterilize== the pump parts?” I asked Rich as the ==entrails== of American soldiers ==spilled out== over the beaches of Normandy.

“The sterilizer thing broke, so I had to reset it,” he said as a man stumbled around ==with his arm blown off== .

Even within these supposedly universal rules of parenthood, that is, there’s a lot of variability. That’s because life events like parenthood seem to change everyone di erently, and how you’ll change is, in part, up to you. For a recent study, Ted Schwaba, a psychologist at Michigan State University, and his co-authors asked thousands of Dutch people about a life event in the past 10 years, such as a divorce or a new job, that they felt had changed who they were as a person. About 7 percent of the participants identified parenthood as the event that changed them, and on average, they felt that it had made them slightly more agreeable and ==conscientious== .

But ==the big takeaway== for Schwaba, from looking at all the data for all the different types of life events, was that there really was no pattern. Some people became more ==extroverted== when they got a new job. Some became less so. Some people actually became less neurotic— that is, less depressed and anxious— after, say, a cancer diagnosis.

To Schwaba, this research suggests that it’s how you experience an event such as parenthood, more than the event itself, that determines how you’ll change. “The same event, like getting divorced, might be someone’s worst thing that’s ever happened to them, and for someone else, it might be the best thing that’s ever happened to them,” he told me.

Or your personality might change not immediately after an event like childbirth, but through a long process that the event sets in motion. It’s not the cry you hear in ==the delivery room== that changes you; it’s the many years of researching child care and ==soothing boo-boos== that gradually turn you into someone new. To change, you have to take steps every day to do so. Having a baby won’t make you a better person. Behaving like a better person for your baby will.

Of all the things I wanted motherhood to change about me, neuroticism was high on the list. Before I had Evan, I felt like I was personally responsible for ==making life unfold perfectly== , and whenever I “failed” to do so, ==I had a meltdown== . One day a few years ago, I got a bad haircut, ==got stuck in traffic== , and had professional photos taken that looked terrible. My response to this—what my new-parent eyes now see as an 8-out-of-10 day—was to ==chug half a bottle of wine== and scream to my husband through sobs, “I hate everyone and everything!”

But now so much goes wrong every single day that there’s no time to get upset about any one thing. I recently took a flight with Evan by myself, an exercise that really underscores the first Noble Truth of Buddhism (life is su­ ering). As I ==hauled== the car seat, the stroller, the baby, the diaper bag, and the ==trendy== , impractical tote from my childless years to the TSA line, an airline attendant took one look at me and said, “I know; it is too much.”

In the middle of the flight, I noticed that the two bottles of formula Evan nervously drank during takeo­ had caught up with him, and that ==he was now soaked with pee== . I grabbed him under the ==armpits== and ==scooted== across the seats to change him in the airplane’s ==postage-stamp-size bathroom== . With one hand, I held him, crying, on the ==changing table== , and with the other, I dug a clean onesie out of the bottom of the diaper bag. I fastened a million tiny onesie buttons. Then I saw that I had ==misaligned== them and fastened them again. Next it was my turn. I couldn’t leave him on the changing table, or put him on the disgusting floor. I ==yanked my leggings down== and held him at arm’s length as I ==peed== .

By the end of that ==ordeal== , I felt accomplished and capable. I didn’t feel like sobbing; ==I felt like high-fiving myself== . I’ve let go in other ways, too. I show up at important meetings without makeup on. I say weird stu­ff to strangers and don’t analyze it obsessively later. Evan has forced me to step outside myself, to break from the relentless self-focus that has contributed to both my success and my unhappiness.

My remaining neuroses are ==laser-directed== on his well-being. I had initially planned not to breastfeed, but once I started, I got so into it that when a doctor suggested that Evan would spit up less if I cut food ==allergens== from my diet, I stopped eating virtually anything but oats and ==spinach for months== . When I was pregnant, we’d ==signed the unborn Evan up for day care== , but as the end of my ==maternity== ==leave loomed== , I embarked on a frantic search for a ==nanny== so he could stay close to me while I worked from home. I had always mentally mocked parents who checked to be sure their babies were still breathing at night, then found myself standing in front of his crib at 3 a.m., feeling for ==puffs of air from two tiny nostrils== .

I yell at Rich less than I used to, because not only is he employee No. 1 of Baby Inc., but he’s the only employee, and frankly there are no other applicants for the job. In fact, the whole experience has made me kinder and more tender, like the Grinch, post–heart enlargement. I’m less worried about wasting time, because all time with a baby is essentially wasted—the most important nothing you’ll ever do in your life. I even love Evan’s wet, violent “kisses,” which leave his baby-teeth imprints on our jaws. When my friend Anton visited recently, he watched me make ==horsey== noises for Evan for what probably felt like hours. “I can’t believe you love an infant!” he said.

During my interview with Ratli­ , I told her that Evan had lately been losing interest in breastfeeding. I had awaited this day through months of ==bleeding nipples and frustration== , but now that it was here, it was making me a bit sad. “Your baby’s moving to the next stage,” she alarmed, “and this one is not going to come back again.” I started ==tearing up== —both at the memory of those bleary, milk-soaked months together and at the realization that he wouldn’t even be a baby for much longer.

During my personality-change experiment, my meditation teacher had tried to hammer home the idea that “ ==this too shall pass== ” is both ==uplifting== and sad: Nothing bad lasts forever, but neither does anything good. Before I had Evan, I was focused on ==impermanence== ’s upsides: This uncomfortable improv show will end; this awful pregnancy will too. But now I’m more keenly aware of its downsides. The sleepless nights will end, but so too will the times Evan squeals at a game of peekaboo, or spends an entire swim class gazing up at me in awe. Every day brings a sigh of relief and a pang of nostalgia. Having someone who loves you, I’ve decided, is a good reason to have kids.

Olga Khazan is a staff writer at The Atlantic. The is essay was adapted from her forthcoming book, Me, but Better: The Science and Promise of Personality Change.

Vocabulary, Phrases and Sentences

Word Chinese Definition Phonetic Symbol
figure out 弄清楚,想出 /ˈfɪɡjə aʊt/
a fertility test 生育能力测试 /ə fəˈtɪləti test/
effortlessly 毫不费力地 /ˈefətlsli/
dribble 使滴下;滴流 /ˈdrɪbl/
gingerly 小心翼翼地 /ˈdʒɪndʒəli/
meridian 子午线;经络 /məˈrɪdiən/
procreate 生育;繁殖 /ˈprəʊkreɪt/
shudder 颤抖;战栗 /ˈʃʌdə(r)/
admittedly 诚然;公认地 /ədˈmɪtɪdli/
neuroticism 神经质;神经过敏 /ˌnjʊəˈrɒtɪsɪzəm/
agreeable 令人愉快的 /əˈɡriːəbl/
extroversion 外向性;外向性格 /ˌekstrəˈvɜːʃn/
clench 紧握;咬紧 /ˈklentʃ/
knit 编织;针织;使紧密结合 /ˈnɪt/
geriatric 老年的;老年医学的 /ˌdʒeriˈætrɪk/
serviceable 有用的;耐用的 /ˈsɜːvəbl/
glossy 光滑的;有光泽的 /ˈɡlɒsi/
lancet 柳叶刀;刺血针 /ˈlɑːnsɪt/
stab 刺;戳;刺痛 /ˈstæb/
graveyard 墓地;坟场 /ˈɡreɪvjɑːd/
gauze 纱布;薄纱 /ˈɡɔːz/
droplet 小滴 /ˈdrɒplət/
dark day 黑暗的日子 /ˈdɑːk deɪ/
cooing 轻声咕咕叫;温柔低语 /ˈkuːɪŋ/
rife 流行的;普遍的;充斥着 /ˈraɪf/
deprivation 剥夺;匮乏 /ˌdeprɪˈveɪʃn/
torn 撕裂的;破损的 /ˈtɔːn/
miscarriage 流产;小产 /ˈmɪskærɪdʒ/
horrific 可怕的;恐怖的 /ˈhɒrɪfɪk/
anecdote 轶事;奇闻 /ˈænɪkdəʊ/
dementia 痴呆 /ˈdemənʃə/
Her face lit up at the sight of him 她一见到他,脸上就露出了喜色。 /hɜː feɪs lɪt ʌp æt ðə saɪt ɒv hɪm/
a wake-up call 警钟;叫醒电话 /ə ˈweɪk ʌp kɔːl/
the existence of and use case for NoseFrida NoseFrida(一种吸鼻器)的存在和使用案例 /ðə ɪɡˈzɪstəns ɒv ænd juːs keɪs fɔː(r) ˈnəʊz friːdə/
sourdough 酸面团;全麦面包 /ˈsaʊədəʊ/
perinatal 围产期的 /ˌperiˈneɪtl/
cohort 一群人;一组;队列 /ˈkəʊhɔːt/
amp up 提高;放大;增强 /ˈæmp ʌp/
agreeableness 宜人;和蔼可亲 /əˈɡriːəblnəs/
iteration 迭代;重复 /ˌɪtəˈreɪʃn/
mindfulness 正念;专注 /ˈmaɪndflnəs/
alleviate 减轻;缓解 /əˈliːvieɪt/
improv 即兴表演 /ˈɪmprɒv/
parenthood 父母身份;亲子关系 /ˈpeərənhʊd/
transform me further 进一步改变我 /ˈtrænsfɔːm miː ˈfɜːðə(r)/
neurotic 神经质的;神经过敏的 /ˈnɜːrɒtɪk/
surrendering 投降;屈服;交出 /ˈsʌrəndərɪŋ/
mold 模具;霉菌;塑造 /ˈməʊld/
embark 上船;着手;开始 /ˈembɑːk/
arduous 艰巨的;费力的 /ˈɑːdjuəs/
choppy 波涛汹涌的;不连贯的 /ˈtʃɒpi/
lean over 俯身;倾斜 /ˈliːn ˈəʊvə(r)/
catamaran 双体船 /ˌkætəməˈræn/
hurl 猛投;猛掷;大声说出 /ˈhɜːl/
as the boat crew force-fed me pita bread 当船员强迫我吃皮塔饼时 /æz ðə bəʊt kruː ˈfɔːs fed miː ˈpiːtə bred/
insane 疯狂的;精神错乱的 /ˈɪnˈseɪn/
glowy 发光的;红润的 /ˈɡləʊi/
goddessy 如女神般的 /ˈɡɔdəsi/
tattoo 纹身;刺青 /ˈtætuː/
supposedly 据说;据推测 /ˈsəʊpəʊzɪdli/
vomit 呕吐;吐出 /ˈvɒmɪt/
swaddles 襁褓;包裹 /ˈswɒdlz/
a kind tide of hormones 一股温和的荷尔蒙潮 /ə kaɪnd taɪd ɒv ˈhɔːməʊnz/
irritability 易怒;过敏 /ˌɪrɪtəˈbɪləti/
spike 尖状物;穗;激增 /ˈspaɪk/
trimester 三个月;孕期的三个月 /ˈtraɪmestə(r)/
womb 子宫 /ˈwuːm/
set me off 使我开始;使我发作 /ˈset miː ˈɔːf/
overhear 无意中听到;偷听 /ˈəʊvəˈhɪə(r)/
contempt 轻视;蔑视 /ˈkəntempt/
divvy 分配;分摊 /ˈdɪvi/
engulf 吞没;吞噬 /ˈɪnˈɡʌlf/
stroller 婴儿车;散步者 /ˈstrəʊlə(r)/
that’s not really something you can take back 那可不是你能收回的事情 /ˈðæts nɒt ˈriːəli ˈsʌmθɪŋ juː kæn ˈteɪk bæk/
spheroid 球体;类球体 /ˈsfɪərɔɪd/
dissident 持不同政见者;异议者 /ˈdɪsɪdənt/
imprisonment 监禁;关押 /ˈɪmˈprɪznmənt/
tastiest 最美味的 /ˈteɪstɪɪst/
plop down on top of a closed trash 扑通一声坐在一个关闭的垃圾桶上 /ˈplɒp daʊn ˈɒn tɒp ɒv ə ˈkləʊzd træʃ/
placenta 胎盘 /ˈplæsntə/
walk over to the delivery wing of the hospital 走到医院的产房区 /ˈwɔːk ˈəʊvə(r) tuː ðə dɪˈlɪvəri wɪŋ ɒv ðə ˈhɒspɪtl/
In the antechamber of the operating room 在手术室的前厅 /ˈɪn ðə ˈæntiˌtʃeɪmbə(r) ɒv ðə ˈɒpəreɪtɪŋ ruːm/
hyperventilate 换气过度;呼吸急促 /ˈhaɪpəˈventɪleɪt/
the medical resident 住院医生 /ˈðə ˈmedɪkl ˈrezɪdənt/
innard 内脏;内部 /ˈɪnəd/
grumpy 脾气暴躁的;易怒的 /ˈɡrʌmpi/
whisk 拂;挥动;迅速带走 /ˈwɪsk/
NICU 新生儿重症监护室 /ˈnɪkjuː/
discharge paperwork 出院文件 /ˈdɪstʃɑːdʒ ˈpeɪpəweɪk/
breastfed 母乳喂养的 /ˈbrestfed/
sleep deprivation 睡眠剥夺 /ˈsliːp ˌdeprɪˈveɪʃn/
addle 使混乱;使糊涂;使变质 /ˈædl/
pediatrician 儿科医生 /ˌpiːdiəˈtrɪʃn/
bit into a piece of chicken 咬了一口鸡肉 /ˈbɪt ˈɪntuː ə ˈpiːs ɒv ˈtʃɪkɪn/
bloody 血腥的;流血的;该死的 /ˈblʌdi/
loosen a crown 松开牙冠 /ˈluːsn ə ˈkraʊn/
agonize 感到极度痛苦;苦苦思索 /ˈæɡənaɪz/
gyration 旋转;回转 /ˌdʒaɪˈreɪʃn/
ointment 药膏;油膏 /ˈɔɪntmənt/
ounce 盎司;少量 /ˈaʊns/
boob 乳房;蠢材 /ˈbuːb/
serenade 小夜曲;唱小夜曲 /ˈserəneɪd/
tear rolling down my cheeks 泪水顺着我的脸颊滚落 /ˈteə(r) ˈrəʊlɪŋ daʊn maɪ ˈtʃiːks/
motherhood 母亲身份;母性 /ˈmʌðəhʊd/
babyhood 婴儿期;幼儿期 /ˈbeɪbihʊd/
feral 野生的;未驯化的 /ˈferəl/
toddler 学步的儿童;蹒跚学步者 /ˈtɒdlə(r)/
precocious 早熟的 /ˈpriːkəʊʃəs/
Signing up to be a parent is signing up to have a lifetime of some degree of depression and anxiety 报名成为父母意味着报名要经历某种程度的一生的抑郁和焦虑。 /ˈsaɪnɪŋ ˈʌp tuː biː ə ˈpeərənt ɪz ˈsaɪnɪŋ ˈʌp tuː hæv ə ˈlaɪftaɪm ɒv səm dɪˈɡriː ɒv dɪˈpreʃn ænd æŋˈzaɪəti/
guilt is another universal 内疚是另一个普遍存在的 /ˈɡɪlt ɪz əˈnʌðə(r) ˈjuːnɪvɜːsl/
masterscence 这个词可能有误,你想问的可能是“mastery”,意为“精通;掌握” /ˈmɑːstəri/
the creeping sense 那种逐渐蔓延的感觉 /ˈðə ˈkriːpɪŋ sens/
attune 使协调;使适应 /ˈəˈtjuːn/
prosocial 亲社会的 /ˈprəʊˈsəʊʃl/
gory 血腥的;暴力的;令人毛骨悚然的 /ˈɡɔːri/
colic 绞痛;疝气 /ˈkɒlɪk/
jiggly confines of his SNOO 他那摇晃的SNOO婴儿床 /ˈdʒɪɡli ˈkɒnfaɪnz ɒv hɪz ˈsnuː/
doula 助产士;导乐 /ˈduːlə/
sarcastically 讽刺地;挖苦地 /ˈsɑːˈkæstɪkli/
stimuli 刺激物;刺激因素(复数形式) /ˈstɪmjəlaɪ/
wailed 哀号;痛哭 /ˈweɪld/
comedown 衰落;落魄;药效消退 /ˈkʌmdəʊn/
sterilize 消毒;使绝育;使贫瘠 /ˈsterəlaɪz/
entrail 内脏;肠 /ˈentreɪl/
spill out 溢出;涌出 /ˈspɪl aʊt/
with his arm blown off 他的手臂被炸掉了 /ˈwɪð hɪz ˈɑːm ˈbləʊn ˈɔːf/
conscientious 认真的;尽责的 /ˈkɒnʃiˈenʃəs/
the big takeaway 最重要的收获 /ˈðə ˈbɪɡ ˈteɪkəweɪ/
extroverted 外向的 /ˈekstrəvɜːtɪd/
the delivery room 产房 /ˈðə ˈdɪlɪvəri ruːm/
soothing boo-boos 抚慰伤痛 /ˈsuːðɪŋ ˈbuːbuːz/
make life unfold perfectly 让生活完美展开 /ˈmeɪk ˈlaɪf ˈʌnfəʊld ˈpɜːfɪktli/
I had a meltdown 我情绪崩溃了 /ˈaɪ hæd ə ˈmeltdaʊn/
chug half a bottle of wine 大口喝了半瓶酒 /ˈtʃʌɡ hɑːf ə ˈbɒtl ɒv ˈwaɪn/
get stuck in traffic 被困在交通堵塞中 /ˈɡet ˈstʌk ɪn ˈtræfɪk/
haule 这个词可能有误,你想问的可能是“haul”,意为“拖;拉;运送” /ˈhɔːl/
trendy 时髦的;流行的 /ˈtrendi/
he was now snaked with pee 他现在被尿弄得到处都是 /ˈhiː wəz naʊ ˈsneɪkt wɪð ˈpiː/
armpit 腋窝 /ˈɑːmpɪt/
scoot 迅速移动;溜走 /ˈskuːt/
postage-stamp-size-bathroom 邮票大小的浴室 /ˈpəʊstɪdʒ stæmp saɪz ˈbɑːθruːm/
changing table 换尿布台 /ˈtʃeɪndʒɪŋ teɪbl/
misaligned 未对齐的;错位的 /ˈmɪsəˈlaɪnd/
yank my leggings down 猛地拉下我的紧身裤 /ˈjæŋk maɪ ˈleɡɪŋz daʊn/
peed 撒尿(过去式和过去分词) /ˈpiːd/
ordeal 折磨;严峻考验 /ˈɔːdiːl/
I felt like high-fiving myself 我想给自己击掌 /ˈaɪ felt laɪk ˈhaɪ faɪvɪŋ maɪˈself/
laser-directed 激光制导的 /ˈleɪzə daɪˈrektɪd/
allergent 这个词可能有误,你想问的可能是“allergen”,意为“过敏原” /ˈælədʒən/
spinach for months 几个月的菠菜 /ˈspɪnɪdʒ fɔː(r) ˈmʌnθs/
signed the unborn Evan up for day care 为未出生的埃文报名参加日托 /ˈsaɪnd ði ˈʌnˈbɔːn ˈevən ˈʌp fɔː(r) ˈdeɪ keə(r)/
maternity 产妇的;孕妇的;产科的 /məˈtɜːnəti/
leave loom 产假临近 (loom有“逼近”的意思,这里推测是leave is looming,表示产假即将来临,你这里原词可能有误,如果不是这个意思,请你纠正) /ˈliːv luːm/
nanny 保姆;奶妈 /ˈnæni/
puff 吸;抽(香烟、烟斗等);吹气;喘息 /ˈpʌf/
air from two tiny nostrils 来自两个小鼻孔的空气 /ˈeə(r) frəm tuː ˈtaɪni ˈnɔstrɪlz/
horsey 马的;像马的;爱马的(常用于儿语) /ˈhɔːsi/
bleeding nipples and frustration 乳头流血和挫折感 /ˈbliːdɪŋ ˈnɪplz ænd frʌˈstreɪʃn/
tear up 撕碎;流泪 /ˈteə(r) ˈʌp/
this too shall pass 这一切也会过去的 /ˈðɪs tuː ˈʃæl pɑːs/
uplift 振奋;提高;举起 /ˈʌplɪft/
impermanence 无常;暂时性;不 permanence /ɪmˈpɜːmənəns/ (这个词本身是名词,没有动词形式,你这里原词permanence是名词“永久,持久”,前面加im - 构成反义词“无常”)

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CAN EUROPE STOP ELON MUSK ?

During an American election, a rich man can hand out $1 million checks to prospective voters. Companies and people can use secretly funded “dark money” nonprofits to donate unlimited money, anonymously, to super PACs, which can then spend it on advertising campaigns. Podcasters, partisans, or anyone, really, can tell outrageous, incendiary lies about a candidate. They can boost those ==falsehoods== through targeted online advertising. No special courts or election rules can stop the ==disinformation== from spreading before voters see it. The court of public opinion, which over the past decade has seen and heard everything, no longer cares. U.S. elections are now a political Las Vegas: Anything goes.

But that’s not the way elections are run in other countries. In Britain, political parties are, at least during the run-up to an election, limited to spending no more than £54,010 per candidate. In Germany, as in many other European countries, the state funds political parties, ==proportionate== to their number of elected ==parliamentarians== , so that politicians do not have to depend on, and become ==corrupted== by, wealthy donors. In Poland, courts ==fast-track== election-related libel cases in the weeks before a vote in order to discourage people from lying.

Nor is this unique to Europe. Many democracies have state or public media that are obligated, at least in principle, to give equal time to all sides. Many require political donations to be transparent, with the names of donors listed in an online registry. Many have limits on political advertising. Some countries also have rules about hate speech and indict people who break them.

Countries apply these laws to create conditions for fair debate, to build trust in the system, and to inspire confidence in the winning candidates. Some democracies believe that transparency matters—that voters should know who is funding their candidates, as well as who is paying for political messages on social media or anywhere else. In some places, these rules have ==a loftier goal== : to prevent the rise of anti democratic ==extremism== of the kind that has ==engulfed== democracies— and especially European democracies— in the past.

But for how much longer can democracies pursue these goals? We live in a world in which ==algorithms== controlled by American and Chinese ==oligarchs== choose the messages and images seen by millions of people; in which money can move through secret bank accounts with the help of ==crypto== schemes; and in which this dark money can then boost anonymous social-media accounts with the aim of shaping public opinion. In such a world, how can any election rules be enforced? If you are ==Albania== , or even the United Kingdom, do you still get to set the parameters of your public debate? Or are you now forced to be Las Vegas too?

ALTHOUGH IT’S EASY to get distracted by the schoolyard nicknames and ==irresponsible== ==pedophilia== accusations that Elon Musk ==flings== around, these are the real questions posed by his open, aggressive use of X to spread false information and promote extremist and anti-European politicians in the U.K., Germany, and elsewhere. The integrity of elections— and the possibility of debate ==untainted== by misinformation injected from abroad—is equally challenged by TikTok, the Chinese platform, and by Mark Zuckerberg’s Meta, whose ==subsidiaries== include Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and threads. TikTok says the company does not accept any paid political advertising. Meta, which announced in January that it is abandoning ==fact-checking== on its sites in the U.S., also says it will continue to comply with European laws. But even before Zucker berg’s radical policy change, these promises were empty. Meta’s ==vaunted== content ==curation== and moderation have never been transparent. Nobody knew, and nobody knows, what exactly Facebook’s algorithm was promoting and why. Even an occasional user of these platforms encounters ==spammers== , ==scammers== , and ==opaque== accounts running foreign influence operations. No guide to the algorithm, and no real choices about it, are available on Meta products, X, or TikTok.

In truth, no one knows if any platforms really comply with political-funding rules either, because nobody outside the companies can fully monitor what happens online during an intense election campaign—and after the voting has ended, it’s too late. According to ==declassified== Romanian-intelligence documents, someone allegedly spent more than $1 million on TikTok content in the 18 months before an election in support of a Romanian presidential candidate who declared that he himself had spent nothing at all. In a belated attempt to address this and other alleged discrepancies, a Romanian court canceled the first round of that election, a decision that itself damaged Romanian democracy.

Not all of this is new. ==Surreptitious== political-party funding was a feature of the Cold War, and the Russian government has continued this practice, sometimes by offering deals to foreign businesspeople close to pro-Russian politicians. Press moguls with international political ambitions are hardly a ==novelty== . Rupert Murdoch, an Australian who has U.S. ==citizenship== , has long played an outsize role in U.K. politics through his media companies. John Major, the former British prime minister and Conservative Party leader, has said that in 1997, Murdoch threatened to pull his newspapers’ support unless the prime minister pursued a more anti-European policy. Major refused. Murdoch has said, “I have never asked a prime minister for anything,” but one of his Conservativeleaning ==tabloids== , the Sun, did endorse the Labour Party in the next election. Major lost.

That incident now seems almost ==quaint== . Even at the height of its influence, the print edition of the Sun sold 4 million copies a day. More to the point, it operated, and still does, within the ==constraints== of U.K. rules and regulations, as do all broadcast and print media. Murdoch’s newspapers take British ==libel== and ==hatespeech== laws into consideration when they run stories. His business strategy is necessarily shaped by rules limiting what a single company can own. After his journalists were accused of hacking phones and bribing police in the early 2000s, Murdoch himself had to testify before an investigative commission, and he closed down one of his tabloids for good.

Social media not only has far greater reach—Musk’s personal X account has more than 212 million followers, giving him enormous power to set the news agenda around the world— ==it also exists outside the legal system== . Under the American law known as Section 230, passed nearly three decades ago, internet platforms are not treated as publishers in the U.S. In practice, neither Facebook nor X has the same legal responsibility for what appears on their platforms as do, say, The Wall Street Journal and CNN. And this, too, has consequences: Americans have created the information climate that other countries must accept, and this allows ==deceptive== election practices to thrive. If countries don’t have their own laws, and until recently most did not, Section 230 ==effectively== requires them to treat social-media companies as if they exist outside their legal systems too.

Brazil broke with this pattern last year, when a judge demanded that Musk comply with Brazilian laws against spreading misinformation and political extremism, and forced X offline until he did. Several European countries, including the U.K., Germany, and France, have also passed laws designed to bring the platforms into compliance with their own legal systems, mandating fines for companies that violate hatespeech laws or host other illegal content. But these laws are controversial and hard to enforce. Besides, “illegal speech” is not necessarily the central problem. No laws prevented Musk from interviewing Alice Weidel, a leader of the ==far-right== Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, on X, thereby providing her with a huge platform, available to no other political candidate, in the month before a national election. the interview, which included several ==glaringly== false statements (among others, that Weidel was the “leading” candidate), was viewed 45 million times in 24 hours, a number far beyond the reach of any German public or private media.

ONLY ON INSTITUTION on the planet is large enough and powerful enough to write and enforce laws that could make the tech companies change their policies. Partly for that reason, the European Union may soon become one of the Trump administration’s most ==prominent== targets. In theory, the EU’s Digital Services Act, which ==took full effect== last year, can be used to regulate, fine, and, in extreme circumstances, ban internet companies whose practices ==clash with== European laws. Yet a primary ==intent== of the act is not ==punitive== , but rather to open up the platforms: to allow ==vetted== researchers access to platform data, and to give citizens more transparency about what they hear and see. Freedom of speech also means the right to receive information, and at the moment social-media companies operate behind a curtain. We don’t know if they are promoting or suppressing certain points of view, ==curbing== or encouraging ==orchestrated== political campaigns, discouraging or provoking violent riots. Above all, we don’t know who is paying for misinformation to be spread online.

In the past, the EU has not hesitated to try to apply European law to tech companies. Over the past decade, for example, Google has faced three fines totaling more than $8 billion for breaking antitrust law (though one of these fines was ==overturned== by the EU’s General Court in 2024).

In November, the European Commission Šned Meta more than $800 million for unfair trade practices. But for how much longer will the EU have this authority? In the fall, J. D. Vance issued an extraordinarily ==unsubtle== threat, one that is frequently repeated in Europe. “If NATO wants us to continue supporting them and NATO wants us to continue to be a good participant in this military alliance,” Vance told an interviewer, “why don’t you respect American values and respect free speech?” Mark Zuckerberg, echoing Vance’s ==misuse== of the expression free speech to mean “freedom to conceal company practices from the public,” put it even more ==crudely== . In a conversation with Joe Rogan in January, Zuckerberg said he feels “optimistic” that President Donald Trump will intervene to stop the EU from enforcing its own ==antitrust== laws: “I think he just wants America to win.”

Does America “winning” mean that European democracies, and maybe other democracies, lose? Some European politicians think it might. Robert Habeck, the German vice ==chancellor== and a leader of that country’s Green Party,

believes that Musk’s ==frenzies== of political activity on X aren’t the random ==blurts== of an ==addled== mind, but rather are “logical and systematic.” In his New Year’s address, Habeck said that Musk is deliberately “strengthening those who are weakening Europe,” including the explicitly anti-European AfD. This, he believes, is because “a weak Europe is in the interest of those for whom regulation is an inappropriate limitation of their power.”

Until recently, Russia was the most important state seeking to ==undermine== European institutions. Vladimir Putin has long disliked the EU because it restricts Russian companies’ ability to intimidate and ==bribe== European political leaders and companies, and because the EU is larger and more powerful than Russia, whereas European countries on their own are not. Now a group of American oligarchs also want to undermine European institutions, because they don’t want to be regulated—and they may have the American president on their side. Quite soon, the European Union, along with Great Britain and other democracies around the world, might find that they have to choose between their ==alliance== with the United States and their ability to run their own elections and select their own leaders without the pressure of aggressive outside manipulation. ==Ironically== , countries, such as Brazil, that don’t have the same deep military, economic, and cultural ties to the U.S. may and it easier to maintain the ==sovereignty== of their political systems and the transparency of their information ecosystems than Europeans.

A ==crunch== point is ==imminent== , when the European Commission finally concludes a year-long investigation into X. ==Tellingly== , two people who have advised the commission on this investigation would talk with me only off the record, because the potential for ==reprisals== against them and their organizations— whether it be online ==trolling== and harassment or lawsuits— is too great. Still, both advisers said that the commission has the power to protect Europe’s sovereignty, and to force the platforms to be more transparent. “¦e commission should look at the ==raft== of laws and rules it has available and see how they can be applied,” one of them told me, “always remembering that this is not about taking action against a person’s voice. ¦is is the commission saying that everyone’s voice should be equal.”

At least in theory, no country is obligated to become ==an electoral Las Vegas== , as America has. Global democracies could demand greater transparency around the use of algorithms, both on social media and in the online-advertising market more broadly. ¦ey could other consumers more control over what they see, and more information about what they don’t see. ¦ey could enforce their own campaign-funding laws. These changes could make the internet more open and fair, and therefore a better, safer place for the exercise of free speech. If the chances of success seem narrow, it’s not because of the lack of a viable legal framework— rather it’s because, at the moment, ==cowardice== is as ==viral== as one of Musk’s ==tweets== .

Vocabulary, Phrases and Sentences

Word Chinese Definition Phonetic Symbol
incendiary 煽动性的 /ɪnˈsendieri/
falsehood 谎言 /ˈfɔːlshʊd/
disinformation 虚假信息 /ˌdɪsɪnfəˈmeɪʃn/
run-up 前期;准备阶段 /ˈrʌn ʌp/
corrupt 腐败的 /kəˈrʌpt/
fast-track 快速推进 /ˈfæst træk/
be obligated 有义务 /ˈbiː ˈɒblɪɡeɪtɪd/
indict 指控 /ɪnˈdaɪt/
a loftier goal 更高的目标 /ə ˈlɔːftiə ˈɡəʊl/
extremism 极端主义 /ɪkˈstriːmɪzəm/
engulfed 吞没 /ɪnˈɡʌlvd/
algorithms 算法 /ˈælɡərɪðəmz/
oligarch 寡头 /ˈɒlɪɡɑːk/
crypto 加密的 /ˈkrɪptəʊ/
irresponsible 不负责任的 /ˌɪrɪˈspɒnsəbl/
fling 扔;抛 /ˈflɪŋ/
untainted 无污点的
subsidiaries 子公司 /ˈsʌbsɪdɪriːz/
It is abandoning fact-checking on its sites in the U.S. 它正在放弃对美国网站的事实核查
vaunted 吹嘘的 /ˈvɔːntɪd/
moderation 适度;节制 /ˌmɒdəˈreɪʃn/
curation 策划;挑选 /ˌkjʊəˈreɪʃn/
spammer 垃圾邮件发送者 /ˈspæmə(r)/
scammer 骗子 /ˈskæmə(r)/
opaque 不透明的 /əʊˈpeɪk/
declassified 解密的 /ˌdiːˈklæsɪfaɪd/
allegedly 据称 /əˈledʒɪdli/
belated 迟来的 /bɪˈleɪtɪd/
discrepancies 差异 /ˌdɪskrepənsiːz/
surreptitious 偷偷摸摸 /ˌsʌrəpˈtɪʃəs/
novelty 新奇 /ˈnɒvlti/
tabloid 小报 /ˈtæblɔɪd/
endorse 支持;认可 /ɪnˈdɔːs/
quaint 古雅的 /ˈkweɪnt/
constraint 限制 /kənˈstreɪnt/
libel 诽谤 /ˈlaɪbl/
hate-speech 仇恨言论 /ˈheɪt spiːtʃ/
It also exists outside the legal system
deceptive 欺骗性的 /dɪˈseptɪv/
effectively 事实上 /ɪˈfektɪvli/
far-right 极右翼 /ˈfɑː raɪt/
glaringly 明显地 /ˈɡleərɪŋli/
prominent 突出的 /ˈprɒmɪnənt/
take full effect 完全生效 /ˈteɪk fʊl ˈɪfekt/
clash with 与……冲突 /ˈklæʃ wɪð/
intent 意图 /ˈɪntent/
punitive 惩罚性的 /ˈpjuːnətɪv/
vetted 审查 /ˈvetɪd/
curbing 控制 /ˈkɜːbɪŋ/
orchestrated political campaigns 精心策划的政治运动 /ˈɔːkɪstreɪtɪd pəˈlɪtɪkl kæmˈpeɪnz/
riot 暴乱 /ˈraɪət/
overturn 推翻 /ˈəʊvətɜːn/
unsubtle 不微妙的 /ˈʌnˈsʌtl/
misuse 滥用 /ˈmɪsjuːz/
crudely 粗糙地 /ˈkruːdli/
antitrust 反垄断的 /ˈæntiˈtrʌst/
chancellor 总理;大臣 /ˈtʃɑːnsələ(r)/
frenzy 狂热 /ˈfrenzi/
blurt 脱口而出 /ˈblɜːt/
addled 糊涂的 /ˈædld/
undermine 破坏 /ˈʌndəˈmaɪn/
bribe 贿赂 /ˈbraɪb/
alliance 联盟 /ˈælaɪəns/
ironically 讽刺地 /aɪˈrɒnɪkli/
sovereignty 主权 /ˈsɒvrənti/
crunch 嘎吱作响;关键时刻 /ˈkrʌntʃ/
imminent 即将来临的 /ˈɪmɪnənt/
tellingly 有效地;显著地 /ˈtelɪŋli/
reprisals 报复 /ˈreprɪzlz/
troll 网络喷子 /ˈtrəʊl/
raft 大量 /ˈrɑːft/
an electoral Las Vegas 常被用来形容一些充满变数、热闹且带有投机性质的场景 /ˈæn ɪˈlektərəl ˈlæz ˈveɪɡəs/
cowardice 懦弱 /ˈkaʊədɪs/
viral 病毒式的 /ˈvaɪrəl/
tweet 推文 /ˈtwiːt/

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WHY THE COVID DENIERS WON

Lessons from the pandemic and its aftermath(by David Frum, a staff writer at the Atlantic)

Five years ago, the coronavirus pandemic ==struck a bitterly divided society== .

Americans first ==diverged over== how dangerous the disease was: just a flu (as President Donald Trump repeatedly insisted) or something much deadlier.

Then they ==disputed== public-health measures such as ==lockdowns== and masking; a majority ==complied== while a passionate minority fiercely resisted.

Finally, they split—and have remained split—over the value and safety of COVID-19 vaccines. Anti-vaccine beliefs ==started on the fringe== , but they spread to the point where Ron DeSantis, the governor of the country’s third-most- ==populous== state, launched a campaign for president on an appeal to anti-vaccine ideology.

Five years later, one side has seemingly triumphed. The winner is not the side that initially prevailed, the side of public safety. The winner is the side that minimized the disease, then rejected publichealth measures to prevent its spread, and finally refused the vaccines designed to protect against its worst effects.

Ahead of COVID ’s fifth anniversary, Trump, as president-elect, nominated the country’s most ==outspoken== vaccination opponent to ==head== the Department of Health and Human Services. He chose a ==proponent== of the ==debunked== and ==discredited== vaccines-cause-autism claim to lead the CDC. He named a ==strident== critic of COVID-vaccine ==mandates== to lead the FDA. For surgeon general, he picked a believer in hydroxychloroquine, the ==disproven== COVID-19 remedy. His pick for director of the National Institutes of Health had advocated for letting COVID spread unchecked to encourage ==herd immunity== . Despite having ==fast-tracked== the develop ment of the vaccines as president, Trump has himself ==trafficked== in many forms of COVID-19 denial, and has expressed his own suspicions that childhood vaccination against ==measles== and ==mumps== is a cause of ==autism== .

The ==ascendancy== of the anti-vaxxers may ultimately prove ==fleeting== . But if the forces of science and health are to ==stage a comeback== , it’s important to understand why those forces have ==gone into eclipse==

From March 2020 to February 2022, about 1 million Americans died of COVID-19. Many of those deaths occurred after vaccines became available. If every adult in the United States had received two doses of a COVID vaccine by early 2022, rather than just the 64 percent of adults who had, nearly 320,000 lives would have been saved.

Why did so many Americans resist vaccines? Perhaps the biggest reason was that the pandemic ==coincided== with a presidential-election year, and Trump instantly recognized the crisis as a threat to his chances for re-election. He responded by denying the seriousness of the pandemic, promising that the disease would rapidly disappear on its own, and promoting ==quack== cures.

The COVID-19 vaccines were developed while Trump was president. They could have been advertised as a Trump achievement. But by the time they became widely available, Trump was out of office. His supporters had already made up their minds to distrust the public-health authorities that promoted the vaccines. Now they had an additional ==incentive== : Any benefit from vaccination would ==redound== to Trump’s successor, Joe Biden. Vaccine rejection became a badge of group loyalty, one that ultimately cost many lives.

A summer 2023 study by Yale researchers of voters in Florida and Ohio found that during the early phase of the pandemic, self-identified Republicans died at only a slightly higher rate than self-identified Democrats in the same age range. But once vaccines were introduced, Republicans became much more likely to die than Democrats. In the spring of 2021, the excess-death rate among Florida and Ohio Republicans was 43 percent higher than among Florida and Ohio Democrats in the same age range. By the late winter of 2023, the 300-odd most pro-Trump counties in the country had a COVID-19 death rate more than two and a half times higher than the 300 or so most anti-Trump counties.

In 2016, Trump had boasted that he could shoot a man on Fifth Avenue and not lose any votes. In 2021 and 2022, his most ==fervent== supporters risked death to prove their loyalty to Trump and his ==cause== .

Why did political ==fidelity== express itself in such selfharming ways?

The ==onset== of the pandemic was an unusually confusing and ==disorienting== event. Some people who got COVID died. Others lived. Some suffered only mild symptoms. Others spent weeks on ==ventilators== , or ==emerged== with long COVID and never fully recovered. Some lost businesses built over a lifetime. Others refinanced their homes with 2 percent interest rates and banked the savings.

We live in an ==impersonal== universe, indifferent to our hopes and wishes, subject to extreme randomness. We don’t like this at all. We crave satisfying explanations. We want to believe that somebody is ==in control== , even if it’s somebody we don’t like. At least that way, we can blame bad events on bad people. This is the eternal appeal of ==conspiracy theories== . How did this happen? Somebody must have done it— but who? And why?

==Compounding== the ==disorientation== , the coronavirus outbreak was a rapidly changing story. The scientists who researched COVID-19 knew more in April 2020 than they did in February; more in August than in April; more in 2021 than in 2020; more in 2022 than in 2021. The official advice kept changing: Stay inside—no, go outside. Wash your hands—no, mask your face. Some Americans appreciated and accepted that knowledge improves ==over time== , that more will be known about a new disease in ==month two== than in ==month one== . But not all Americans saw the world that way. They mistrusted the idea of knowledge as a developing process. Such Americans wondered: Were they lying before? Or are they lying now?

In a different era, Americans might have ==deferred== more to medical authority. The internet has upended old ideas of what should count as authority and who possesses it. The pandemic reduced normal human interactions. Severed from one another, Americans deepened their para social attachment to social-media platforms, which ==foment== alienation and rage. Hundreds of thousands of people plunged into ==an alternate mental universe== during COVID-19 lockdowns. When their doors reopened, the ==mania== did not ==recede== . Conspiracies and mistrust of the establishment—never strangers to the American mind—had been nourished, and they grew.

The experts themselves contributed to this loss of trust.

It’s now agreed that we had little to fear from going outside in dispersed groups. But that was not the state of knowledge in the spring of 2020. At the time, medical experts insisted that any kind of mass outdoor event must be sacrificed to the ==imperatives== of the emergency. In mid-March 2020, federal public-health authorities shut down some of Florida’s beaches. In California, surfers faced heavy fines for ==venturing== into the ocean. Even the COVID-skeptical Trump White House reluctantly canceled the April 2020 Easteregg roll.

And then the experts abruptly reversed themselves. When George Floyd was choked to death by a Minneapolis police officer on May 25, 2020, hundreds of thousands of Americans left their homes to protest, ==defying== three months of ==urgings== to avoid large gatherings of all kinds, outdoor as well as indoor.

On May 29, the American Public Health Association issued a statement that proclaimed racism a public-health crisis while ==conspicuously== refusing to condemn the sudden ==defiance== of public-safety rules.

The next few weeks saw the largest mass protests in recent U.S. history. Approximately 15 million to 26 million people attended outdoor Black Lives Matter events in June 2020, according to a series of reputable ==polls== . Few, if any, scientists or doctors scolded the attendences—and many politicians joined the protests, including future Vice President Kamala Harris. It all raised a suspicion: Maybe the authorities were making the rules based on politics, not science.

The ==politicization== of health advice became even more ==consequential== as the summer of 2020 ended. Most American public schools had closed in March. “At their peak,” Education Week reported, “the closures affected at least 55.1 million students in 124,000 U.S. public and private schools.” By September, it was already apparent that COVID-19 posed relatively little risk to children and teenagers, and that remote learning did not work. At the same time, returning to the classroom before vaccines were available could pose some risk to teachers’ health—and possibly also to the health of the adults to whom the children returned after school.

How to balance these concerns given the ==imperfect== information? Liberal states decided in favor of the teachers. In California, the majority of students did not return to in-person learning until the fall of 2021. New Jersey kept many of its public schools closed until then as well. Similar things happened in many other states: Illinois, Maryland, New York, and so on, through the states that voted Democratic in November 2020.

Florida, by contrast, reopened most schools in the fall of 2020. Texas soon followed, as did most other Republican-governed states. The COVID risk for students, it turned out, was minimal: According to a 2021 CDC study, less than 1 percent of Florida students ==contracted== COVID-19 in school settings from August to December 2020 after their state restarted in-person learning. Over the 2020–21 school year, students in states that voted for Trump in the 2020 election got an average of almost twice as much ==inperson== instruction as students in states that voted for Biden.

Any risks to teachers and school staff could have been ==mitigated== by the universal vaccination of those groups. But deep into the fall of 2021, thousands of blue-state teachers and staff resisted vaccine mandates— including more than 5,000 in Chicago alone. By then, another school year had been interrupted by closures.

BY DISPARAGING public-health methods and ==discrediting== vaccines, the COVID-19 ==minimizers== cost hundreds of thousands of people their lives. By keeping schools closed longer than absolutely necessary, the COVID maximizers hazarded the futures of young Americans.

Students from poor and troubled families, in particular, will continue to pay the cost of these learning losses for years to come. Even in liberal states, many private schools reopened for in-person instruction in the fall of 2020. The ==affluent== and ==the connected== could buy their children a continuing education unavailable to those who depended on public schools. Many lower-income students did not return to the classroom: Throughout the 2022–23 school year, poorer school districts reported much higher ==absenteeism== rates than were seen before the pandemic.

Teens absent from school typically get into trouble in ways that are even more damaging than the loss of math or reading skills. New York City arrested 25 percent more minors for serious crimes in 2024 than in 2018. The national trend was similar, if less stark. The FBI reports that although crime in general declined in 2023 compared with 2022, crimes by minors rose by nearly 10 percent.

People who finish schooling during a recession tend to do worse even into middle age than those who finish in times of prosperity. They are less likely to marry, less likely to have children, and more likely to die early. The ==disparity== between those who finish in lucky years and those who finish in unlucky years is greatest for people with the least formal education.

Will the harms of COVID prove equally enduring? We won’t know for some time. But if past experience holds, the COVID-19 years will mark their most ==vulnerable== victims for decades.

THE STORY OF COVID can be told as one of shocks and disturbances that wrecked two presidencies. In 2020 and 2024, ==incumbent== administrations lost elections back-to back, something that hadn’t happened since the deep economic depression of the late 1880s and early 1890s. The pandemic caused a recession as steep as any in U.S. history. The aftermath saw the worst inflation in half a century.

In the three years from January 2020 through December 2022, Trump and Biden both signed a series of major bills to revive and rebuild the U.S. economy. Altogether, they swelled the gross public debt from about $20 billion in January 2017 to nearly $36 billion today. The weight of that debt helped drive interest rates and mortgage rates higher. The burden of the pandemic debt, like learning losses, is likely to be with us for quite a long time.

Yet even while acknowledging all that went wrong, respecting all the lives lost or ruined, reckoning with all the lasting harms of the crisis , we do a dangerous ==injustice== if we remember the story of COVID solely as a story of American failure. In truth, the story is one of strength and ==resilience== .

Scientists did deliver vaccines to prevent the disease and treatments to recover from it. Economic policy did avert a global depression and did rapidly restore economic growth. Government assistance kept households afloat when the world shut down— and new remote-work practices enabled new patterns of freedom and happiness after the pandemic ended.

The virus was first detected in December 2019. Its ==genome== was sequenced within days by scientists collaborating across inter national borders. Clinical trials for the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine began in April 2020, and the vaccine was authorized for emergency use by the FDA in December. Additional vaccines rapidly followed, and were universally available by the spring of 2021. The weekly death ==toll== fell by more than 90 percent from January 2021 to midsummer of that year.

The U.S. economy roared back with a strength and power that ==stunned== the world. The initial ==spike== of inflation has ==subsided== . Wages are again rising faster than prices. Growth in the United States in 2023 and 2024 was faster and broader than in any peer economy.

Even more ==startling== , the U.S. recovery ==outpaced== China’s. That nation’s ==bounceback== from COVID-19 has been slow and ==faltering== . America’s economic lead over China, once thought to be narrowing, has suddenly widened; the gap between the two countries’ GDPs grew from $5 trillion in 2021 to nearly $10 trillion in 2023. The U.S. share of world economic output is now slightly higher than it was in 1980, before China began any of its economic reforms. As he did in 2016, Trump ==inherits== a strong and healthy economy, to which his own ==reckless== policies— notably, his trade protectionism—are the only visible threat.

In public affairs, our bias is usually to pay most attention to disappointments and mistakes. In the pandemic, there were many errors: the partisan ==dogma== of the COVID minimizers; the ==capitulation== of states and ==municipalities== to favored interest groups; the hypo chondria and neuroticism of some COVID maximizers. Errors need to be studied and the lessons ==heeded== if we are to do better next time. But if we fail to acknowledge America’s successes—even partial and imperfect successes— we not only do an injustice to the American people. We also defeat in advance their confidence to collectively meet the crises of tomorrow.

Perhaps it’s time for some national self-forgiveness here. Perhaps it’s time to accept that despite all that went wrong, despite how much there was to learn about the disease and how little time there was to learn it, and despite polarized politics and an ==unruly== national character—despite all of that—Americans collectively met the COVID-19 emergency about as well as could reasonably have been hoped.

The wrong people have profited from the immediate aftermath. But if we remember the pandemic accurately, the future will belong to those who rose to the crisis when their country needed them

Vocabulary, Phrases and Sentences

Word Chinese Definition Phonetic Symbol
strike a bitterly divided society 引发一个严重分裂的社会
diverge over 在……上产生分歧
dispute 争论;争议 /dɪˈspjuːt/
lockdowns 封锁
comply 遵守 /kəmˈplaɪ/
start on the fringe 从边缘开始
populous 人口众多的 /ˈpɒpjələs/
outspoken 直言不讳的 /ˌaʊtˈspəʊkən/
proponent 支持者;拥护者 /prəˈpəʊnənt/
debunk 揭穿;揭露 /diːˈbʌŋk/
discredit 诋毁;使不可信 /dɪsˈkredɪt/
strident 尖锐的;刺耳的 /ˈstraɪdənt/
mandate 授权;命令 /ˈmændeɪt/
herd immunity 群体免疫
fast-tracked 快速推进的
traffick 非法交易;贩卖 /ˈtræfɪk/
disprove 证明……错误;反驳 /ˌdɪsˈpruːv/
measles 麻疹 /ˈmiːzlz/
mumps 腮腺炎 /ˈmʌmps/
autism 自闭症 /ˈɔːtɪzəm/
ascendancy 优势;支配地位 /əˈsendənsi/
fleeting 短暂的;飞逝的 /ˈfliːtɪŋ/
stage a comeback 卷土重来
go into eclipse 失势;黯然失色
coincide 同时发生;相符 /ˌkəʊɪnˈsaɪd/
quack 江湖郎中;庸医 /kwæk/
incentive 激励;动机 /ɪnˈsentɪv/
redound 产生某种结果;有助于 /rɪˈdaʊnd/
fervent 热烈的;热情的 /ˈfɜːvənt/
cause 原因;事业;使发生 /kɔːz/
fidelity 忠诚;忠实 /fɪˈdeləti/
onset 开始;发作 /ˈɒnset/
disorienting 使人迷失方向的
ventilator 呼吸机 /ˈventɪleɪtə(r)/
emerge with long COVID 出现长期新冠症状
impersonal 客观的;非个人的 /ɪmˈpɜːsənl/
somebody is in control 某人掌控着局面
conspiracy theory 阴谋论
compounding the disorientation 加剧迷失方向感
month two 第二个月
month one 第一个月
defer 推迟;延期 /dɪˈfɜː(r)/
foment 煽动;挑起 /fəʊˈment/
an alternative mental universe 另一个精神世界
mania 狂热;躁狂症 /ˈmeɪniə/
recede 后退;减弱 /rɪˈsiːd/
imperatives 必要的事;紧急的事 /ɪmˈperətɪvz/
defy 违抗;无视 /dɪˈfaɪ/
conspicuously 明显地;引人注目地 /kənˈspɪkjuəsli/
defiance 违抗;蔑视 /dɪˈfaɪəns/
poll 民意调查;投票 /pəʊl/
politicization 政治化
consequential 重要的;有重大影响的 /ˌkɒnsɪˈkwenʃl/
contract 合同;契约;感染;收缩 /ˈkɒntrækt/ /kənˈtrækt/
imperson 这个拼写有误,可能是intense(强烈的;紧张的),音标为/ɪnˈtens/
affluent 富裕的;富足的 /ˈæfluənt/
absenteesim 旷工;旷课
disparity 差异;悬殊 /dɪˈspærəti/
vulnerable 脆弱的;易受伤害的 /ˈvʌlnərəbl/
incumbent 在职者;现任者 /ɪnˈkʌmbənt/
injustice 不公正;不公平 /ɪnˈdʒʌstɪs/
resilience 适应力;复原力 /rɪˈzɪliəns/
genome 基因组 /ˈdʒiːnəʊm/
toll 伤亡人数;损失;钟声 /təʊl/
stun 使震惊;使昏迷 /stʌn/
spike 尖峰;激增;长钉 /spaɪk/
subside 平息;减退 /səbˈsaɪd/
startle 使惊吓;使吃惊 /ˈstɑːtl/
outpace 超过;比……快 /ˌaʊtˈpeɪs/
bounceback 反弹;恢复
falter 犹豫;蹒跚;衰退 /ˈfɔːltə(r)/
inherit 继承;遗传 /ɪnˈherɪt/
reckless 鲁莽的;不顾后果的 /ˈrekləs/
dogma 教条;教义 /ˈdɒgmə/
capitulation 投降;屈服 /kəˌpɪtʃuˈleɪʃn/
municipality 市政当局;自治市 /ˌmjuːnɪˈsɪpələti/
heed 注意;听从 /hiːd/
unruly 难以控制的;不守规矩的 /ʌnˈruːli/

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John Doe

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Changchun, China